The Salt Lake Investment Company v. Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc., Sharron Killion, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen, Dix Jensen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
The Salt Lake Investment Company v. Wilford H.
Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc., Sharron Killion, James
T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen, Dix Jensen : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Derek Langton; Parsons, Behle and Latimer; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Robert C. Cummings; Michael D. Cummings; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The Salt Lake Investment Company v. Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries, No. 950705 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6922
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
y T A H C 0 U R T Q F 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPEAL FROM 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, JUDGE 
COURT 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
225 South 200 East, No. 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DEREK LANGTON Telephone: (801) 322-1141 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellees Jensen 
P. O. BOX 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
WILFORD N. HANSEN, JR. 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Appellees, Wilford H. Hansen 
Stone Quarries, Inc., and Killion 
P. O. Box 67 
Payson, Utah 84651-0067 




K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. ^OlO^-rK 
Case No. 950705-CA 
Priority (15) 
FILED 
APR - * 1996 
H T OF APPEAL 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 950705-CA 
Priority (15) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, JUDGE 
Plaintiff 
DEREK LANGTON 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellees Jensen 
P. O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
WILFORD N. HANSEN, JR. 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Appellees, Wilford H. Hansen 
Stone Quarries, Inc., and Killion 
P. O. Box 67 
Payson, Utah 84651-0067 
Telephone: (801) 465-9288 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for 
and Appellant 
225 South 200 East, No. 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1141 




ISSUES FOR REVIEW 1, 2, 3, 4 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 2,3,4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
NATURE OF THE CASE 4 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 5 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE 
EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF 
PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF ITS ASSETS . . . . 10 
POINT II. THE POWER OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION TO 
PROTECT ITS ASSETS IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY 
TIME LIMITATION, AND THERE IS NO REASON 
IN LOGIC OR POLICY FOR IMPOSING SUCH 20 
POINT III. THE QUIT CLAIM DEEDS FROM EVELYN 
BOYCE AND LOIS CONNELL WERE A NULLITY . . . . 22 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION HAS NOT BEEN 
DISSOLVED 26 
POINT V. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT SALT LAKE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY CANNOT BE SUED 28 
POINT VI. THE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT . 28 
CONCLUSION 29 
ADDENDUM 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 4, 15 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I, Section 7 4, 15 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 16-1-2 12, 13 
Section 16-10-88 4, 26 
Section 16-10-100 4, 12 
Section 16-10-101 4, 12, 13 
Section 16-10a-1405 4, 8, 11, 12, 23, 24 
Section 16-10a-1405 (2) (a) 23 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) 1 
Section 78-40-13 4, 24 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 3(a) 1 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 12(b) 5, 25 
Rule 21 25 
Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-501 (b) and (c) 4, 10, 29 
Babcock v. Dangerfield 
98 Utah 10, 94 P2d 862 (1939) 26 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. 
860 P2d 937 (Utah 1993) 4 
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co. 
43 Utah 277, 135 P. 103 (1913) 25 
Falconaero Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley 
Investment Company 
16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P2d 915 (1964) 12, 13 
Girard v. Appleby 
660 P2d 245 (Utah 1983) 4 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County 
855 P2d 231 (Utah 1993) 2 
McKay & Knobel Enter., Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, Inc. 
23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P2d 828 (1969) 13 
Screwmen's Benev. Assn. of Louisiana v. Monteleone 
168 Louisiana 664, 122 Southern 116 (1929) 14 
Tree v. White 
110 Ut 233, 171 P2d 398 (1946) 27 
State v. Pena 
869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2, 4 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co. 
870 P2d 880 (Utah 1993) 2 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title 
780 P2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 1989) 2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, and 
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
A. Does a dissolved corporation retain its corporate 
existence and powers for the purpose of protecting and disposing of 
its assets, including standing to sue to quiet title to real 
property owned by it? (See Point I. and Point III.) Is it for the 
same reasons subject to being sued regarding title to said assets? 
(See Point V.) This issue was preserved in memoranda at R. 56, 
201, and 194. 
Case No. 950705-CA 
Priority (15) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A motion for summary judgement is 
only proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No 
deference is given to lower court's determination as to existence 
of fact issue. Wycalis v. Guardian Title. 780 P2d 821, 825 (Utah 
App. 1989). A fact issue exists as to whether the corporation is 
dissolved (see Issue C below), but even if we assume that it has 
been dissolved, the extent and powers of its continued existence 
are issues of law. Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P2d 231 (Utah 
1993) . This issue will be considered by the appellate court for 
correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 
870 P2d 880 (Utah 1993). No deference will be given to the lower 
court's decision on this issue. State v. Pena. 869 P2d 932 (Utah 
1994) . 
B. If plaintiff corporation has such standing, is there 
any time limit within which action to protect its property must be 
commenced? (See Point II.) This issue was preserved in memoranda 
at R. 56 and 201. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Appellant believes this to be a legal issue to be decided 
under the same standards as Issue A above. If the clear meaning of 
the applicable statute is to be limited by the implication of some 
standard of reasonableness, then a genuine issue of material fact 
is raised and summary judgment is improper. Hiaains v. Salt Lake 
County, supra. 
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C. Has plaintiff corporation been dissolved? (See 
Point IV.) This issue was preserved at memoranda at R. 48 and 193. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
A motion for summary judgement is only proper if there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Since no evidentiary hearing was 
held, this issue was not resolved as a fact issue to which the 
normal standard of review of "clearly erroneous" would apply. The 
lower court ruled that the corporation was dissolved as a matter of 
law, and therefore the same standard applies as stated in 
connection with Issue A. Furthermore, all facts and inferences 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
(in this case the plaintiff) against whom summary judgment is 
sought. 
D. Was plaintiff entitled to oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment (and to alter and amend)? (See Point 
VI.) This issue was preserved at memorandum at R. 46. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The issue of whether the lower court properly denied oral 
argument as a legal issue, and the same standard applies as is set 
forth in Issue A above. The said ruling will be reviewed for 
correctness, and the appellate court will give no deference to the 
lower court's legal conclusion concerning whether plaintiff's 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment was frivolous. Rule 
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4-501 (b) and (c) , Code of Judicial Administration, and State v. 
Pena, supra. 
E. Should plaintiff have been allowed to amend to 
correct any error with regard to proper party plaintiff? (See 
Point III.) This issue was preserved at memorandum at R. 49. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The appellate court will review this issue for abuse of 
discretion (lack of reasonable basis). Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch. , 860 P2d 937 (Utah 1993). Amendment is to be liberally 
allowed in the interest of justice. Girard v. Appleby. 660 P2d 245 
(Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
The following Statutes, Rules and Cases are believed 
to be determinative of the issues in this action and are set forth 
in full in the Addendum hereto: 
1. Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution 
2. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. 
3. Section 16-10a-1405 and its predecessor, Section 16-10-
101 UCA 
4. Section 16-10-88 UCA, which was in effect in 1965. 
5. Section 78-40-13 UCA 
6. Rule 4-501 (b) and (c), Code of Judicial Administration. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. This is an action by plaintiff 
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seeking to quiet title to three tracts of real property situated in 
Utah County. (R. 5) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. Defendant, Wilford H. Hansen 
Stone Quarries, Inc., a Utah corporation (hereafter "Corporate 
Defendant"), and defendant, Sharron Killion (hereinafter 
"Killion") , filed a Corrected Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-claim. 
(R. 89) Plaintiff filed a Amended Reply to said Counterclaim (R. 
114) , and defendants, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix 
Jensen (hereinafter "Jensens") filed an Answer to said Cross-claim. 
(R. 107) The Jensens did not answer plaintiff's Complaint, but 
filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b), URCP, or in the 
Alternative for Summary Judgment. (R. 9) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. The lower court treated 
the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the same with 
prejudice. (R. 162, 184) Timely Motion to Alter and Amend 
Judgment was served and filed by plaintiff, but was denied. (R. 
232) The Counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and Killion was 
dismissed with prejudice. (R. 254) The Cross-claim of said 
defendants against the Jensens was dismissed without prejudice. (R 
254). Notice of Appeal was filed on July 7, 1995 (R.238), and an 
Amended Notice of Appeal was filed October 4, 1995 (R. 256), after 
the lower court entered its "Supplemental Order Confirming 
Dismissal of All Claims" on September 29, 1995. (R. 254) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the lower court to 
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quiet title to three tracts of real property (mining claims) 
situated in Utah County, The Jensens were involved with only one 
of the tracts, and the other defendants were involved in all three 
of them. (R. 5) 
B. The Jensens filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b), URCP, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, alleging 
that plaintiff corporation had been dissolved and therefore had no 
standing to sue to quiet title to said properties, and alleged that 
the Jensens had received quit claim deeds from plaintiff's "sole 
remaining former shareholders to the Amis No. 1 claim. (R. 8) 
C. The Corporate Defendant and Killion answered 
plaintiff's Complaint and filed a Counterclaim against plaintiff 
and a Cross-Claim against the Jensens (R. 89). Plaintiff filed a 
Reply to said Counterclaim (R. 110) and the Jensens filed an Answer 
to the Cross-claim. (R.107) 
D. Defendants filed no affidavits, but several were 
filed on behalf of plaintiff. The Jensens and plaintiff filed 
certified copies of documents tending to show that some of the 
statutory steps for dissolution of plaintiff corporation had been 
undertaken. (R. 36 and 40) The Jensens filed a Certificate of the 
Utah Division of Corporations stating that plaintiff corporation 
had been dissolved. (R. 41) Plaintiff however filed a Certificate 
of Search of the Utah Division of Corporations certifying that 
Certificate of Dissolution could not be found. (R. 154) 
E. The Jensens never filed an answer to plaintiff's 
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Complaint and no discovery was undertaken, completed, or allowed. 
F. The lower court granted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the Jensens and dismissed the plaintiff's Complaint in 
its entirety and with prejudice as to the Jensens and also as to 
all other defendants in this action. (R. 162, 184) The lower 
court's order is based upon the following reasoning: w. . . Salt 
Lake Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in 
1965, and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or 
be sued in Utah courts." 
G. The lower court's Order granting summary judgment 
did not deal with the merits of the quiet title action. (R. 162, 
184) 
H. Although requested (R. 46) , oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment was denied on the grounds that 
plaintiff's opposition was "frivolous". (R. 162, 159) Although 
requested, oral argument on the plaintiff's motion to alter and 
amend was not allowed. (R. 232) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE 
EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF 
ITS ASSETS. 
Plaintiff denies that it has been legally dissolved, but 
argues that dissolution is irrelevant on the issue of its right to 
sue and be sued. Utah statutes since at least 1898, together with 
Utah case law, make it abundantly clear that a dissolved 
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corporation retains title to its assets and retains its corporate 
existence for the purpose of protecting its assets and winding up 
its affairs. Although this has been the state of the law during 
all of the years involved in this action, the current statute, 
Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, provides: 
"(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate 
existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate 
to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be 
distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its 
liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its 
shareholders according to their interest; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs. 
"(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property..." 
Plaintiff also argues that any rule requiring a voluntary 
or involuntary transfer of title to assets to the shareholders of 
the corporation is impractical and fraught with problems. Instead 
of stabilizing land titles, such a rule will hopelessly confuse and 
complicate them. 
POINT II. THE POWER OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION TO 
PROTECT ITS ASSETS IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY TIME LIMITATION, AND THERE 
IS NO REASON IN LOGIC OR POLICY FOR IMPOSING SUCH. 
Plaintiff argues that the foregoing statutes do not set 
any time limit on protecting or disposing of assets by a dissolved 
corporation, and argue that there is no reason in logic or policy 
for imposing such. 
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Plaintiff points out that if there were such a limitation 
(for example as a "reasonable time"), this would present a fact 
question which would preclude summary judgment in any event. 
The lower court's apparent fear that statutes of 
limitation will run if some time limit is not imposed is misplaced. 
Statutes of limitation in adverse possession actions do not begin 
to run until someone takes some action adverse to the owner. There 
is no showing in this case that any of the required triggering 
events ever occurred 30 years ago. 
POINT III. THE QUIT CLAIM DEEDS FROM EVELYN BOYCE AND 
LOIS CONNELL WERE A NULLITY. 
Jensens assert that they obtained quit claim deed from 
certain of plaintiff corporation's stockholders, and apparently 
argue therefrom that they have title to the disputed Amis No. 1. 
The lower court never reached the merits and did not make any 
ruling on ownership of Amis No. 1 or as to the other two claims. 
Nevertheless, since this issue of the quit claim deeds was raised 
by the Jensens, plaintiff feels that it must respond. Plaintiff's 
response is three fold: (1) Said stockholders had no title to give 
to anyone, because the title was vested in the corporation as 
argued in Point I above; (2) The said quit claim deeds were 
obtained by fraud and mistake and are invalid in any event; 
(3) Defendants must prevail, if at all, on the strength of their 
own title and not on any weakness in plaintiff's title. 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION HAS NOT BEEN DISSOLVED. 
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Although this issue is not crucial to the outcome of the 
case, plaintiff argues that a corporation is not dissolved until a 
"Certificate of Dissolution" is issued by the State of Utah, and in 
this case the Utah Division of Corporations has certified that 
there is no Certificate of Dissolution on file. Under Utah case 
law, if a document is not found where it is supposed to be, there 
is a presumption that it does not exist. Therefore, plaintiff 
corporation has never been dissolved. 
POINT V. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY CANNOT BE SUED. 
For the same reasons as set out in Point I above, a 
dissolved corporation is subject to suit as well as retaining the 
right to sue to protect its assets. The lower court's ruling to 
the contrary is contrary to statutory and case law, and is bad law. 
POINT VI. THE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT. 
Jensens' motion for summary judgment was dispositive and 
under Rule 4-501 (b) and (c) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, plaintiff was entitled to oral argument. 
Plaintiff's arguments are grounded in fact and warranted by 
existing law, as demonstrated by the preceding points. Such 
arguments were not "frivolous," and plaintiff was entitled to oral 
argument. The lower court acted arbitrarily and injudiciously in 
denying oral argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE 
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EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF 
ITS ASSETS. 
Plaintiff denies that it has been dissolved. (See Point 
III of this Brief.) Plaintiff contends, however, that it is 
irrelevant whether it has been dissolved or not because under Utah 
law, even if a corporation is dissolved, it retains its corporate 
existence and powers for the purpose of protecting and disposing of 
its assets. Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, provides: 
"(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate 
existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate 
to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be 
distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its 
liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its 
shareholders according to their interest; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs. 
"(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, 
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of 
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of 
directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or 
removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its 
articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against 
the corporation in its corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against 
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of 
the corporation." (Emphasis added.) 
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The foregoing provision was enacted in 1992 and is the 
currently-applicable provision. Prior thereto the relevant statute 
was found at Section 16-10-101, UCA, which provided as follows: 
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either 
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) 
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period 
of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation 
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up 
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior 
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such 
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The said Section 101 existed in that form since 1961 when 
the Utah Business Corporation Act, of which it was a part, was 
adopted (except that prior to 1984 the Secretary of State was 
referred to rather than the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code), and prior thereto the substance of said Section was found in 
Section 16-1-2, UCA, and in substantially that form has been a part 
of our law in Utah since at least 1898. 
Section 16-10A-1405, UCA, does not contain any time 
limitation. Nor was there any time limitation in the predecessor 
statute which was in effect from 1961 until 1992, and which was 
found at Section 16-10-101, UCA. 
In Falconaero Enterprise. Inc. v. Valley Investment 
Company, 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P2d 915 (1964), our Supreme Court 
upholds the clear meaning of said Section 101 where the court 
states at page 915: 
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"Next, it is asserted that because of a dissolution 
of the plaintiff corporation, it had no standing in 
court, which seems to be answered by Title 16-10-100, 16-
10-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
Although the case of McKay & Knobel Enter., Inc. v. Teton 
Van Gas, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P2d 828 (1969), dealt with a 
corporate suspension, it found that the law relating to dissolution 
was "instructive" and the court speaking through Justice Crockett 
referred to said Section 16-10-101 and said Section 16-1-2 and 
stated in connection therewith: 
"We accept the fact that there are good and sufficient 
reasons for this declared policy of the law that a 
corporation, even though dissolved, is able to sue and 
protect its assets. This enables it to better discharge 
the duties the law imposes upon it: to pay its taxes; 
to pay its creditors; to meet its obligations to 
stockholders who have invested in it. If in the process 
of *winding up its affairs' the supposedly * insolvent' 
corporation should manage to salvage sufficient assets to 
revive and continue its life, it is only reasonable to 
suppose that it would have as much right to sue and 
conserve them as if it had proved to be completely 
defunct." (Emphasis added.) 
The court then went on to say that: 
"The considerations set forth above as to why a dissolved 
corporation, whose life has thus presumably been 
terminated, should be able to protect its assets, would 
seem to apply for even stronger reasons to a corporation 
which has merely been * suspended.'" 
The lower court ruled that the suspended corporation 
could sue to protect the subject asset which in the Mackay case was 
a negligence claim. 
Even in the absence of a statutory provision such as we 
have in Utah, it has been held under the corporate law generally 
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that even after dissolution, the corporation retains title to its 
assets. For example, in Screwmen's Benev. Assn. of Louisiana v. 
Monteleone. 168 Louisiana 664, 122 Southern 116 (1929), the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana held at pages 117 and 118: 
"When once a legal and valid existent corporation becomes 
the owner of property, such property remains the property 
of the corporation until disposed of in a manner provided 
by the charter or by the law. 
"Neither the stockholders of a stock corporation nor the 
members of a non-stock corporation ever become the owners 
in common of the property of such corporations. . . 
"The same is true with respect to a corporation whose 
charter has expired, has been forfeited, or for any other 
cause has been dissolved. 
"Therefore, the property here involved continued to be 
the property of the corporation, separate and distinct 
from the members, and will remain so until disposed of or 
transferee in some manner provided by law." 
It is therefore clear that a dissolved corporation 
retains its corporate existence to protect and dispose of its 
assets. 
There are sound reasons for the rule adopted by our 
statutes and our case law. We believe assert that numerous titles 
in Utah (and no doubt elsewhere) are still held in the names of 
dissolved corporations. The lower court's decision would deny to 
all of them the protection of the law. Plaintiff in its Complaint 
alleges ownership of said three mining claims. That allegation 
must be taken as true on this motion for summary judgment. Since 
the plaintiff corporation has title, and since that title is 
contested by defendants, and since the lower court has ruled that 
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plaintiff has no standing to sue to protect its title, one may 
reasonably ask what is plaintiff to do? These possibilities 
present themselves: 
(1) Since plaintiff cannot protect its title, it must 
forfeit to anyone who wants to seize it. 
(2) Plaintiff can convey its title to some person or 
entity who has standing to sue to protect the property. 
(3) Plaintiff's title has somehow become vested in its 
shareholders, who have the right to sue in their own names to 
protect it. 
Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn. 
(1) FORFEITURE. Title to real property cannot be 
abandoned, and titles don't just evaporate or disappear. There is 
no justification to require that plaintiff's title be forfeited to 
strangers for lack of ability to defend it. The law does not favor 
forfeitures. We are aware of no policy of the law that supports 
this conclusion. It would clearly violate the due process and 
equal protection clause of the federal constitution, United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, as well as the due process 
clause of our state constitution, Constitution of Utah, Article I, 
Section 7. It is an absurd conclusion and one contrary to 
justice, common sense and orderly procedure. 
(2) VOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF TITLE TO A NEW ENTITY OR TO 
SHAREHOLDERS. 
The statutes which we have cited clearly permit this. 
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However, said statutory provisions also say that the corporation 
can sue to protect its assets. The lower court has, however, now 
ruled that after 30 years a corporation can no longer sue. If 30 
years deprives the corporation of the right to sue to protect its 
assets, then logically the same 30 years must also preclude it from 
conveying the property. On the other hand, if 30 years does not 
preclude the corporation from conveying the property, then 
logically it should not preclude the corporation from suing to 
protect it. There is no logical reason for treating the two 
provisions differently. 
Is there any policy reason for doing so? Is it proper to 
deny access to the courts as some kind of a punishment for not 
having disposed of the assets within some fixed period of time? We 
do not think the Utah statutes so intend. In referring to "winding 
up," our statutes are limiting the kinds of things the dissolved 
corporation can do, not the time in which they must be 
accomplished. Many legitimate reasons exist for not disposing of 
assets within some fixed period of time. 
One reason is that corporation may have overlooked the 
fact of its ownership. Original officers and directors eventually 
die, and their successors in ownership of the stock of the mining 
company may not be fully aware of all of its assets. The law would 
not penalize an individual in this circumstance, why should it seek 
to penalize a dissolved corporation? 
Another reason is that as mining has declined in Utah, 
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some mining companies could no longer function economically, but 
they nevertheless held on to their claims, no doubt in the hope 
that mining would either improve, or at least that some profitable 
use could be found for the land, as has occurred in the Park City 
area for example. Here again the law does not penalize an 
individual for this approach, and it should not penalize a 
dissolved corporation either. 
Counsel for plaintiff is involved with a number of these 
old companies. One has something like 700 shareholders. Another 
has approximately 30. We believe that many such corporations 
exist. (We believe that the law is as we contend if there is only 
one such corporation, but if the extent of the problem dictates the 
applicable law, then discovery will be necessary to establish how 
widespread this problem is. Plaintiff requested the opportunity to 
conduct such (R. 196), but it was not permitted.) 
Although the instant case does not involve 700 
shareholders, the statutes make no distinction on the basis of the 
number of shareholders, and the law applicable to the situation of 
dissolved corporations will have to be the same no matter how large 
or small the corporation may be. Due process and equal protection 
require no less. The problems which the lower court's decision has 
created become very apparent when we apply them to a corporation 
having numerous shareholders. 
It is not feasible to try to form a new corporation and 
issue stock in the new company to all of the old shareholders. 
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Economics and the securities laws would prohibit or at least make 
any such an attempt impractical. There is no way that these 
shareholders can realistically be given stock in some new 
corporation. 
A rule requiring the voluntary conveyance of the title 
from the corporation to its shareholders is simply not feasible. 
If for example 700 stockholders become tenants in common of a 
mining claim, then how can it ever be sold? Ownership of a mining 
claim by such a large group as tenants in common will inevitably 
bring unnecessary conflicts and problems. Allowing the corporation 
the right to sell in an economic manner the assets which are still 
held in the name of the corporation for the benefit of the known 
stockholders and delivering to the Utah State Unclaimed Property 
Division the money belonging to the missing shareholders seems to 
be the best solution. 
(3) INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF TITLE TO SHAREHOLDERS. 
This proposal is objectionable for the same reasons as 
set out for a voluntary transfer to shareholders. 
Because of the problems inherent in title vesting in 
shareholders, no one is going to voluntarily do it. An involuntary 
transfer will by definition bring with it all of the problems 
mentioned, and probably many other problems as well. 
(4) A RULE REQUIRING VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF 
TITLE TO SHAREHOLDERS CREATES NUMEROUS AND UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS. 
The following are only a few of the numerous and complex 
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problems which are created if the courts adopt the rule that the 
assets of a dissolved corporation must be transferred by the 
corporation to its shareholders, either voluntarily or by operation 
of law: 
1. Is a shareholder of a dissolved corporation to be 
able to sell his interest at any time? Only after 30 years? At 
some point less than 30 years? 
2. Does the same rule apply to his right to mortgage the 
property? 
3. If the corporation sells the entire claim to a third 
party, and an individual shareholder sells his 1/700 of the claim 
(assuming he owns that percentage of the stock) to another third 
person, who prevails? 
4. Does the corporation lose title at some point, so 
that its deed is totally invalid? 
5. Can the corporation deed out at any time if the 
individual shareholders have not done so? 
6. Can both the corporation and the individual 
shareholders deed out, and the one who first records gets title? 
7. Does the transfer of stock in a dissolved corporation 
carry with it the real estate, or after dissolution does the real 
estate vest in the stockholder, so that transfer of his stock does 
not carry with it his interest in the real estate? 
8. If the transfer of the shares does carry with it the 
shareholders vested undivided interest in the real estate, then 
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what problems have we created by allowing real estate to be 
transferred without a deed? 
9. Voluntary transfer without a deed has not heretofore 
been allowed, so how can it be wise or prudent to allow it now? 
It is clear that the decision of the lower court instead 
of stabilizing titles will only hopelessly confuse them. 
Plaintiff does not seek to go back into business. It 
only seeks to quiet title to the subject mining claims so that it 
can dispose of them advantageously, and it is far more economical 
to allow the dissolved corporation to conduct the quiet title 
action than to require the shareholders to do so. Such suits would 
be cumbersome, unwieldy and unduly time-consuming. 
POINT II. THE POWER OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION TO 
PROTECT ITS ASSETS IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY TIME LIMITATION, AND THERE 
IS NO REASON IN LOGIC OR POLICY FOR IMPOSING SUCH. 
The aforesaid Utah statutory provisions do not have any 
time limitations. There is no reason in logic or policy for 
imposing such. 
At the outset it should be noted that if some kind of a 
time limitation is to be read into said statutory provisions, such 
as a "reasonable time" for example, then what is a "reasonable" 
time limit would have to depend upon all of the circumstances. 
Such is an issue of fact and cannot be adjudicated on motion for 
summary judgment in any event. As noted above there a number of 
reasons why a dissolved corporation may retain title to its 
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property and not distribute or otherwise dispose of it. 
The lower court seemed to be influenced by the time 
factor, when it stated in substance that nearly all statutes of 
limitation will have run in 30 years. The court was in error in 
this regard. 
Statutes of limitation which are involved in a quiet 
title action do not begin to run until someone takes some action 
adverse to the owner. They do not begin to run until certain 
triggering events occur, and there is no showing in this case that 
any of those triggering events ever occurred 30 years ago. In 
fact, the Jensens did not even become involved with the title to 
the tract which plaintiff seeks to quiet against them until 1993. 
Certainly no statute of limitations has run since 1993. There is 
certainly no showing that defendants will be prejudiced by the 
lapse of 1 or 2 years. Normally ownership for over 30 years 
strengthens titles. Why in this case should 30 or more years of 
ownership by plaintiff somehow be held against plaintiff? Since 
the Jensens have had no connection with this title prior to 1993, 
how can they complain of the lapse of 30 years as it relates to 
ownership of said tract? The problems which the lower court 
envisioned with regard to statutes of limitation, records and 
memories do not exist. But even if there a problem in this area, 
it is a situation which the Jensens voluntarily chose to get 
involved in, and they cannot complain of the fact situation which 
they voluntarily entered into in 1993. 
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It is therefore clear that plaintiff retains its 
corporate existence and powers for the purposes of protecting and 
disposing of its assets and that it can do anything incidental 
thereto, including suing to preserve and protect the same so that 
it will have something to dispose of. That, of course, is the 
purpose of the instant lawsuit: to preserve and protect the 
subject mining claim so that plaintiff can sell or otherwise 
dispose of said asset in the most advantageous way. 
POINT III. THE QUIT CLAIM DEEDS FROM EVELYN BOYCE AND 
LOIS CONNELL WERE A NULLITY. 
The lower court did not rule on the merits and did not 
rule one way or the other on the validity of certain quit claim 
deeds signed by Evelyn Boyce and Lois Connell. Nevertheless, the 
Jensens argued that said deeds gave title to the Jensens, and we 
feel that the validity thereof must be addressed. In support of 
their motion for summary judgment, the Jensens submitted copies of 
quit claim deeds from Evelyn Boyce and Lois Connell. Plaintiff 
contends that said deeds are a nullity and irrelevant for at least 
three reasons: 
1. Evelyn Boyce and Lois Connell did not have title. 
2. Plaintiff contends that the said deeds were obtained 
by fraud. 
3. The Jensens must prevail upon the strength of their 
own title and not upon any apparent weakness in the title of 
plaintiff. 
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BOYCE AND CONNELL HAVE NO TITLE: 
The Jensens never allege under oath or otherwise 
demonstrate that plaintiff ever made any conveyance to Boyce and 
Connell, nor do they allege under oath or otherwise any facts 
showing a conveyance by the plaintiff to Boyce, Connell or anyone 
else. The Jensens make the statement at page 5 of their memorandum 
that "Consequently, even assuming arguendo that SLIC had 
theretofore still possessed any interest in Amis No. 1, Connell and 
Boyce, as SLIC's sole remaining former shareholders, conveyed such 
interest to the Jensen Defendants." 
For the reasons set out in Point I# we do not believe the 
shareholders hold title to the property of a dissolved corporation. 
If dissolution of a corporation automatically passes title to its 
assets to the shareholders, there would be no need for a statute 
such as the said Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, which provides that a 
dissolved corporation retains title to its assets and retains its 
corporate capacity to protect and dispose of its assets. If the 
shareholders automatically succeed to the title to the assets, why 
did the legislature make such provisions? This has clearly always 
been the law of Utah (at least since 1898) , but it has now been 
specifically codified in said Section 16-10a-1405 (2) (a), which 
provides that dissolution does not; "transfer title to the 
corporation's property." (Emphasis added.) 
We also desire to note that, with the possible exception 
of the law of descent and adverse possession, the title to real 
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property can only be acquired by deed. That mode for the transfer 
of title is obviously the one contemplated by said Section 16-10a-
1405, and as noted above the Jensens do not and cannot claim that 
there has ever been any deed from plaintiff to any of its 
shareholders as to the subject property. 
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT THE SAID QUIT CLAIM DEEDS WERE OBTAINED BY 
FRAUD: 
This is a quiet title action, and Section 78-40-13, UCA, 
dealing with actions to quiet title provides: 
"When the summons has been served and the time for 
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hear 
the cause as in other cases, and shall have jurisdiction 
to examine into and determine the legality of the 
plaintiff's title and of the title and claims of all the 
defendants and of all unknown persons, and to that end 
must not enter any judgment by default against unknown 
defendants, but must in all cases require evidence of 
plaintiff's title and possession and hear such evidence 
as may be offered respecting the claims and title of any 
of the defendants, and must thereafter enter judgment in 
accordance with the evidence and the law . . • " 
This means that plaintiff shall have the right to present 
evidence upon the issue of its claimed title, and the Jensens shall 
have the right to contest such evidence, and likewise the Jensens 
shall have the right to present evidence upon the issue of any 
title they claim in themselves, and plaintiff shall have the same 
right to contest such title. If the Jensens' claimed title rests 
upon said quit claim deeds, then, as noted above, plaintiff 
contests said deeds and claims that said deeds were obtained by 
fraud and mistake and are invalid, and in a quiet title action have 
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the right to so prove if they can do so, and cannot be precluded 
from doing so by a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. See 
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 43 Utah 277, 135 P. 103 (1913). 
If the quit claim deed of shareholders is somehow in law 
the quit claim deed of the corporation through some kind of a 
merger of identities, then it would appear that the corporation can 
assert any defenses regarding fraud and mistake of the 
shareholders, and that it would not appear necessary to join Boyce 
and Connell to try the validity of the said quit claim deeds. In 
such event, the plaintiff corporation will assert the defense of 
fraud and mistake under the present pleadings should the plaintiffs 
assert the said quit claim deeds in this quiet title action by way 
of counterclaim. Even if the said deeds were only raised by way of 
answer by the Jensens, plaintiff can still raise the defense of 
fraud and mistake under Rule 12(b), URCP, which provides in part: 
"...If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which 
the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law 
of fact to that claim for relief." 
If under any theory the presence of Boyce and Connell in 
this action is necessary, plaintiff timely requested leave to join 
them. (R. 49) There is no justification for dismissing plaintiff's 
claims because of any misjoinder because under Rule 21, URCP, 
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for 
dismissal of an action." 
The opportunity to amend to join a proper party or 
parties should have been granted. 
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JENSENS MUST PREVAIL UPON STRENGTH OF THEIR OWN TITLE: 
It is clear that there is no defect in plaintiff's title, 
or at least a fact issues exists on that point. Furthermore, it 
must further be noted that if the Jensens are to prevail in this 
quiet title action it must be upon the strength of their own title 
and not upon any weakness in plaintiff's title. See Babcock v. 
Danaerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P2d 862 (1939). Neither the Jensens 
nor any of the other defendants have established their own title by 
any means. 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF CORPORATION HAS NOT BEEN DISSOLVED. 
Although the plaintiff corporation filed a Statement of 
Intent to Dissolve dated June 18, 1965, and filed Articles of 
Dissolution dated December 29, 1965 (R. 36 and 40) , no Certificate 
of Dissolution was ever issued by the state and the plaintiff was 
never dissolved. (R. 154) 
Section 16-10-88, UCA, which was in effect in 1965 
provided as follows: 
"Duplicate originals of such articles of dissolution 
shall be delivered to the secretary of state. If the 
secretary of state finds that such articles of 
dissolution conform to law, he shall, when all fees have 
been paid as in this act prescribed: 
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate originals the word 
xfiled,' and the month, day and year of the filing 
thereof. 
(2) File one of such duplicate originals in his office. 
(3) Issue a certificate of dissolution to which he shall 
affix the other duplicate original. 
"The certificate of dissolution, together with the 
duplicate original of the articles of dissolution affixed 
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thereto by the secretary of state, shall be returned to 
the representative of the dissolved corporation• Upon 
the issuance of such certificate of dissolution the 
existence of the corporation shall cease, except for the 
purpose of suits, other proceedings and appropriate 
corporate action by shareholders, directors and officers 
as provided in this act." (Emphasis added.) 
The Jensens presented a certified copy of the Division of 
Corporations certifying that the plaintiff corporation had been 
dissolved. (R. 41) They did not present a Certificate of 
Dissolution. Plaintiff, however, presented a Certificate of that 
same Division of Corporations certifying that no Certificate of 
Dissolution could be found. (R. 154) 
In Tree v. White, 110 Ut 233, 171 P2d 398 (1946), the 
Utah Supreme Court cited with approval at page 400 of the opinion 
the following quotation from Hall v. Kellogg, 16 Mich. 135, 139: 
" 'The law presumes that all officers entrusted with the 
custody of public files and records, will perform their 
official duty by keeping them safely in their offices. 
Where a paper is not found where, if in existence, it 
ought to be deposited or recorded, the presumption 
therefore arises that no such document has ever been in 
existence. Piatt v. Stewart, 10 Mich. 260. Until this 
presumption is rebutted, it must stand as proof of such 
non-existence.'fl 
The Supreme Court of Utah went on to say: 
"It would extend a presumption beyond all rational 
limitations to assume that documents which cannot be 
found where they should be found if executed, were 
nevertheless properly executed and attached to the proper 
records." 
Without a Certificate of Dissolution there has been no 
dissolution of plaintiff corporation under our statute. The 
presumption that there has never been any such Certificate of 
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Dissolution has not been rebutted. At the very least a fact issue 
exists as to which certificate of the Division of Corporation is 
correct, which the lower court could not resolve on the face of the 
two conflicting certificates. The Division was apparently aware 
that it had exceeded its authority in purporting to certify that 
plaintiff was dissolved and was reluctant to contradict itself by 
issuing the certificate of search demonstrating that its initial 
certification was in error. Counsel for plaintiff relates these 
difficulties in two affidavits in the record. (R. 61 and 128) They 
finally issued it however. (R. 154) 
The lower court erred in finding a de facto dissolution. 
Such a finding is contrary to our statute and is meaningless. Our 
statute, as we have noted above, expressly keeps a dissolved 
corporation alive when it states that it: "continues its corporate 
existence," it is thus de jure not de facto until it disposes of 
its assets, and there is no basis in law to conclude that it is a 
de facto dissolved corporation. 
POINT V. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY CANNOT BE SUED. 
The lower court has stated in its said Order that 
plaintiff "lacks standing to sue or be sued in Utah courts." 
(Emphasis added.) The lower court's ruling would require a 
plaintiff who desired to quiet title against a dissolved 
corporation having 700 shareholders, to track down and name as 
parties 700 shareholders. This is manifest error. 
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POINT VI. THE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ORAL ARGUMENT. 
Jensens7 motion for summary judgment was dispositive and 
therefore under Rule 4-501 (b) and (c), Code of Judicial 
Administration, plaintiff was entitled to oral argument. 
Plaintiff's arguments are grounded in fact and warranted by 
existing law. Where the statute says that dissolution does not 
divest a corporation of its assets, is it "frivolous" to claim the 
benefit of that statute? Could any lawyer fail to do so> without 
being accused of incompetence? The lower court acted arbitrarily 
and injudiciously in denying oral argument. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the 
District Court in favor of the Jensens and against plaintiff should 
be reversed, and this action remanded for^  tri* 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. 
Section 16-10a-1405 
Section 16-10-101 UCA (predecessor to Sec. 16-10a-1405) 
Section 16-10-88 UCA, which was in effect in 1965. 
Section 78-40-13 UCA 
Rule 4-501 (b) and (c), Code of Judicial Administration. 
IMPORTANT PLEADINGS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 
Page of record 
Complaint 5 
Motion to Dismiss, or Alternately 
for Summary Judgment 9 
Certification of Voluntary Dissolution 41 
Certificate of Search 154 
Ruling (on motion for summary judgment) 162 
Order Granting Jensen Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 184 
Ruling (on motion to alter and amend) 232 
Supplemental Order 254 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
1. Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
2. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
3. Section 16-10a-1405 UCA: 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence 
but may not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind 
up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be 
distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its 
liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its 
shareholders according to their interest; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, 
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of 
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of 
directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or 
removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its 
articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against 
the corporation in its corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against 
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of 
the corporation. 
4. Section 16-10-101 UCA: 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either 
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) 
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period 
of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation 
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up 
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior 
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such 
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers. 
5. Section 16-10-88 UCA, which was in effect in 1965: 
Duplicate originals of such articles of dissolution shall 
be delivered to the secretary of state. If the secretary 
of state finds that such articles of dissolution conform 
to law, he shall, when all fees have been paid as in this 
act prescribed: 
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate originals the word 
* filed,' and the month, day and year of the filing 
thereof. 
(2) File one of such duplicate originals in his office. 
(3) Issue a certificate of dissolution to which he shall 
affix the other duplicate original. 
The certificate of dissolution, together with the 
duplicate original of the articles of dissolution affixed 
thereto by the secretary of state, shall be returned to 
the representative of the dissolved corporation. Upon 
the issuance of such certificate of dissolution the 
existence of the corporation shall cease, except for the 
purpose of suits, other proceedings and appropriate 
corporate action by shareholders, directors and officers 
as provided in this act. 
Section 78-40-13 UCA: 
When the summons has been served and the time for 
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hear 
the cause as in other cases, and shall have jurisdiction 
to examine into and determine the legality of the 
plaintiff's title and of the title and claims of all the 
defendants and of all unknown persons, and to that end 
must not enter any judgment by default against unknown 
defendants, but must in all cases require evidence of 
plaintiff's title and possession and hear such evidence 
as may be offered respecting the claims and title of any 
of the defendants, and must thereafter enter judgment in 
accordance with the evidence and the law. The judgment 
shall be consclusive against all the persons named in the 
summons and complaint who have been served and against 
all such unknown persons as stated in the complaint and 
summons who have been served by publication. 
Rule 4-501 (3) (b) and (c), Code of Judicial Administration: 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues in the acdtion on the 
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing 
th principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to 
a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds 
that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is 
frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of 
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., A Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION, 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
The plaintiff complains of the defendants and for cause 
of action alleges as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is a Utah corporation sometimes known 
and designated in the Office of the Utah Secretary of State (and 
successors) as Corporate File No. 30474. 
2. The plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and 
entitled to possession of a certain real property ("Property") 







AMIS NO. 1 PLACER, a patented mining claim being Patent 
Mineral Survey No. 4224, and being a part of Sections 35 
and 36, Township 11 South, Range 9 East, SLB&M. 
(Containing approximately 17.466 acres.) 
3. The defendants assert and claim an interest in and 
to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which 
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said 
Property. 
4. The claim asserted by the defendants is without any 
right whatsoever, and the said defendants have no estate, right, 
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part 
thereof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That the defendants be required to set forth the 
nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all 
adverse claims of the defendants be determined by decree of this 
court and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed 
as follows: 
A. That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple 
and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the 
defendants, and that the title to the Property, and the whole 
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the defendants. 
B. That the defendants and any and all persons, if 
any, claiming by, through or under defendants have no right, title 
or interest in, or lien upon, the above-described Property, or any 
part thereof; that any and all adverse claims of the defendants be 
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declared null and void and of no further force and effect; and that 
the defendants and all persons, if any, claiming by# through or 
under said defendants be forever enjoined, debarred and restrained 
from asserting any claim or interest whatsoever in or to the said 
Property herein described adverse to the ownership and title of the 
plaintiff in and to said Property or clouding plaintiff's title 
thereto. 
C. That the plaintiff be awarded such further and 
additional relieftas to the court may seem just and proper. 
D. For costs and for such other relief as is just 
* 
to be granted in the premises. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
The plaintiff complains of the defendants, Wilford H. 
Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc. and Sharron Killion (hereinafter 
referred to as "Defendants" in this Second Cause of Action), and 
for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is a Utah corporation sometimes known 
and designated in the Office of the Utah Secretary of State (and 
successors) as Corporate File No. 30474. 
2. The plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and 
entitled to possession of certain tracts of real property 
("Property") situate in Utah County, Utah, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Tract No. 1: 
PHILIPPINE MINE LODE, a patented mining claim being 
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000 
Patent Mineral Survey No. 5874, and being part of Section 
25, Township 6 South, Range 1 West, SLB&M. (Containing 
approximately 20.661 acres.) 
Tract No. 2: 
B, Bl, B2, B3, B4, and B5 LODE, a group of patented 
mining claims being Patent Mineral Survey No. 6866, and 
being part of Sections 35 and 36, Township 9 South, Range 
3 West, SLB&M. (Containing approximately 121.955 acres.) 
3. The Defendants assert and claim an interest in and 
to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which 
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said 
Property. 
4. Th£ claim asserted by the Defendants is without any 
right whatsoever, and the said Defendants have no estate, right, 
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part 
thereof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That the Defendants be required to set forth the 
nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all 
adverse claims of the Defendants be determined by decree of this 
court, and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed 
as follows: 
A. That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple 
and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the 
Defendants, and that the title to the said Property, and the whole 
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the Defendants. 
B. That the Defendants and any and all persons, if 
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any, claiming by, through or under Defendants have no right, title 
or interest in, or lien upon, the above-described Property or any 
part thereof; that any and all adverse claims of the Defendants be 
declared null and void and of no further force and effect; and that 
the Defendants and all persons, if any, claiming by, through or 
under said Defendants be forever enjoined, debarred and restrained 
from asserting any claim or interest whatsoever in or to the 
Property herein described adverse to the ownership and title of the 
plaintiff in and, to said Property or clouding plaintiff's title 
thereto. 
C. That the plaintiff be awarded such further and 
additional relief as to the court may seem just and proper. 
D. For costs and for such other relief as is just 
to be granted in the premises. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
The plaintiff complains of the defendants, Wilford H. 
Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc. and Sharron Killion (hereinafter 
referred to as "Defendants11 in this Second Cause of Action) , and 
for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. The plaintiff adopts the allegations of the First 
Cause of Action. 
2. The Defendants have removed stone, or other 
materials, or both (hereinafter collectively described as "Stone") 
from said Property without authorization from the plaintiff. 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged by such unauthorized 
-5-
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removal of Stone in an amount not now known to plaintiff, and 
discovery will be necessary to ascertain the full extent of said 
damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendants for damages for the reasonable value of the Stone thus 
removed from the property, as proved at trial, together with 
interest and costs, and for such other relief as is just to be 
granted in the premises. 
/ IL/ 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
-6-
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DEREK LANGTON (4068) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen, 
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
• • * * • * * 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUAR-
RIES, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES 
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other 
persons unknown, claiming any 
right, title, estate or inter-
est in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the 
pleading adverse to the plain-
tiff's ownership, or clouding 
its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR AL-
TERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940400611 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
* * * * * * * 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendants James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix 
Jensen (hereinafter the "Jensen Defendants") hereby respectfully 
move the Court for an Order dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint 
146749 
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with prejudice as against said Jensen Defendants for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted on the grounds that 
(1) plaintiff was a Utah corporation which was voluntarily 
dissolved in 1965, and which therefore no longer exists, (2) 
plaintiff's sole remaining former shareholders, who are the 
individuals purporting to act on behalf of the corporate plaintiff 
in bringing the present action, previously quit-claimed their 
interests, if any, in the Amis No. 1 placer mining claim to the 
Jensen Defendants. 
Alternatively, because the Jensen Defendants are 
submitting certain documents in support of this Motion, this Motion 
can properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant 
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Motion is further based on the accompanying 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support hereof. 
DATED t h i s 3 f l f t i a y of December, 1994. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
(BV ^ T^^ti^ / ^ ^ e ^ 
5EREK LANGTOr 
Attorneys for defendants James 
Tc Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen 
and Dix Jensen 
000 a 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereDy certify that on this 2D day of December, 1994, 
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to: 
Robert C. Cummings 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
146749 -3- 000 
CERTIFICATION OF 
VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
filed Articles of Incorporation on February 19, 1955, 
filed Articles of Dissolution with this office on 
December 30, 1965 
and that the above named corporation was dissolved on 
December 30, 1965, 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
File Number: CO 030471 
JDiF^te* 
7/ 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT after searching the records in 
our office and the permanent file of the corporation by the name 
SALTLAJCE INVESTMENT COMPANY, file #030474, 
it appears that a Certificate of Dissolution document cannot be found. 
It is unknown whether such a document was issued or in fact, ever 
existed. 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
Dated this 24th 
"/. March . I!) 95 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
of 
P«-ED 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
SHARRON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN, 
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all 
other persons unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the 
real property described in the pleading 
adverse to the Plaintiffs-ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR( 
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
r» 
CASE NO. 940400611 
DATE: March 27, 1995 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' (James, Jerry, and Dix Jensen) 
Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Defendants, represented by 
Derek Langton, filed memoranda in support of the motion. Plaintiff, represented by Robert C. 
Cummings, filed memoranda in opposition to the motion. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have 
submitted documents outside of the pleadings, and therefore, the Court considers the motion 
as a motion for summary judgment. The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda 
and other documents submitted to the Court, now enters the following: 
RULING 
L 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
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According to the records of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah, the 
Salt Lake Investment Company filed Articles of Incorporation on February 19, 1955, 
Statement of Intent to Dissolve on October 22, 1965, and Articles of Dissolution on 
December 30, 1965. The Department of Commerce was unable to determine whether or not a 
Certificate of Dissolution was issued, but certified that the corporation was voluntarily 
dissolved on December 30, 1965. 
The Articles of Dissolution signed by Evelyn P. Boyce and Laron A. Boyce affirm 
that all debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have been discharged and that all 
property and assets of the corporation have been distributed among its shareholders. There 
has been no evidence of any activity whatsoever of the Salt Lake Investment Company for 
nearly 30 years; no business transacted, no filing of tax returns, etc. However, on October 




Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, together with the affidavits present no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Evidence which is in dispute 
should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kirberg v. West 
One Bank. 872 P.2d 39, 40-41 (Utah App. 1994); Higgins v. Salt Lake City. 855 P.2d 231, 
233 (Utah 1993). 
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In Defendants' motion, the first claim is that Plaintiff, Salt Lake Investment Company, 
is a dissolved corporation which does not have standing to sue or be sued. In response, 
Plaintiff asserts that the corporation was not dissolved because an actual Certificate of 
Dissolution cannot be located. However, the Court finds that based upon the filing of the 
Notice of Intent to Dissolve and of Articles of Dissolution with the Department of Commerce, 
that the Department properly determined that the Salt Lake Investment Company was 
dissolved. Even if the Court were to deem the inability of the Department to locate a 
Certificate of Dissolution as supporting the conclusion that the corporation was not dissolved 
on December 30, 1965, the Court finds that thirty years of total inactivity together with the 
other filings is sufficient to find a defacto dissolution. 
Plaintiffs next argument is that even if the corporation is dissolved, Utah statutory law 
in effect in 1965 as well as the present allows a corporation to sue and be sued after 
dissolution as part of the winding-up process. See Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-1405 
(1953 as amended in 1992); U.C.A. §16-10-101 (in effect in 1965). This Court finds that 30 
years is far beyond a reasonable time to wind-up the activities of a corporation. Nearly every 
single statute of limitations would have run in such a time, records have certainly been lost, 
memories faded, and defendants would certainly be prejudiced by allowing a corporation to 
sue under the "winding-up" exception thirty years after dissolution. Therefore, the Court finds 
that Plaintiff Salt Lake Investment Company has no standing to sue or be sued in Utah courts, 
and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
ooo
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Each party has requested oral arguments in this matter. However, the Court finds 
Plaintiffs opposition to the motion to be frivolous, and therefore, declines to hear oral 
arguments on the motion pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(c). 
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an order of dismissal of all claims 
consistent with this ruling, and the file shall be closed. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 27th day of March, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Derek Langton, Esq. 
Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Esq. 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
ooo 159 
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DEREK LANGTON (4068) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen, 
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUAR-
RIES, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES 
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other 
persons unknown, claiming any 
right, title, estate or inter-
est in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the 
pleading adverse to the plain-
tiff's ownership, or clouding 
its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMA-
RY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940400611 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
* * * * * * * 
The Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary 
Judgment, dated December 30, 1994, filed by defendants James T. 
Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen (hereinafter the "Jensen 
Defendants") regularly came before the Court for decision. Because 
000 184 162037 
both Plaintiff and the Jensen Defendants submitted documents 
outside of the pleadings for the Court's consideration, the Court 
accordingly treats the Motion as one for summary judgment pursuant 
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
After full consideration of the memoranda, papers and 
documents submitted by Plaintiff and the Jensen Defendants in 
support of and in opposition to the subject Motion, the Court 
issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternative-
ly, for Summary Judgment, dated March 27, 1995. In its Ruling, the 
Court determined, based on the undisputed facts, that the Salt Lake 
Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in 1965, 
and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or be 
sued in Utah courts. Accordingly, 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Jensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary 
162037 - 2 - 000 183 
Judgment, is hereby granted, and all claims set forth in Plain-
tiff's Complaint shall be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this Z 7 day of /l^\ / £ , ,1995. 
BY THE COURT •/. 
tli •' 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
"'V Cl'-.' 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
A t t o r n e y f o r p l a i n t i f f 
162037 - 3 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _/ day of April, 1995, I 
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DEPENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to: 
Robert C. Cummings 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr. 
HANSEN & MAUGHAN 
Mountain'View East Professional Plaza 
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7 
P.O. Box 67 





IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC. a Lftah corporation, 
SHARON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN, 
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all 
other persons unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the 
real property described in the pleading 
adverse to the plaintiffs ownership, or 
clouding it's title thereto, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ALTER AND 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
CASE: 940400611 
DATE: June 9, 1995 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 59(e), URCP. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Points & Authorities in 
Support of its motion with Defendants filing a Memorandum in Opposition to the motion. 
Plaintiff also filed a Reply Memorandum. The Court after carefully considering the 
memoranda now enters the following: 
RULING 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On March 27, 1995 the Court, upon motion of Defendants, Dismissed the complaint 
filed by Plaintiff Salt Lake Investment Company against the Defendants. The Court found 
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that Plaintiff Corporation had dissolved, either de jure or de facto, nearly thirty years prior to 
the commencement of the action. Based on this finding the Court applied Utah law in effect 
in 1965, the year of dissolution, and determined that there was no legal basis for the suit to 
proceed. 
Plaintiff now requests that the judgment be altered or amended due to plain error in 
applying the law. 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Is the Order to Dismiss based on a faulty application of statutory law? 
m. 
DISCUSSION 
In reviewing the file the Court found that the Order signed by the Court is titled Order 
Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment However, a plain reading of the 
Order clearly indicates that the case was dismissed for lack of standing. The Court believes 
that such a drafting error is a harmless error and not grounds for attacking the decision. 
Plaintiff does not in fact raise this issue in its pleading and while referring to the Order as a 
Summary Judgment Order, the arguments presented deal with the issues of standing and the 
dismissal of the action. 
Nothing in the memoranda filed with the Court persuades this Court that the judgment 
should be altered or amended. Plaintiff corporation filed an intent with the State of Utah to 
dissolve and according to the Articles of Dissolution filed with the State and signed by the 
2 
officers of the corporation HA11 remaining property and assets of the corporation have been 
distributed among its shareholders, in accordance with their respective rights and interests." 
Articles of Dissolution Fourth paragraph dated December 29, 1965 and filed with the State on 
December 30, 1965. This certified statement along with the inaction of the corporation to 
exert any action showing ownership or control over this property during the nearly thirty 
years prior to this action supports the Court's finding of defacto dissolution and the lack of 
standing to bring the action. This Court is not persuaded by the cases relied upon by Plaintiff 
in argument. In Falconaero Enterprise. Inc. v. Valley Investment Company. 395 P.2d 915 
(Utah 1964), there are insufficient facts detailed to determine whether the acceptance of the 
staiurory wording of Title 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, (in effect in 1965 but repealed in 1992), 
relied upon in that case by that court applies to the instant case. In MacKav & Knobel 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van Gas. Inc.. 460 P.2d 828 (Utah), the court used the statutory 
provisions of Title 16-10-100 and 16-10-101 to analogize to a case where the corporation 
powers had been suspended by the state. Neither of these cases provide substantial support 
for the arguments set forth by Plaintiff. 
IV. 
DECISION 
This Court declines to disturb the prior decision. In light of the above discussion, the 






(1) Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c) 
UJA. 
(2) Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment is denied. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this J_ day of A//l^ . 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
cc: Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
Derek Langton, Esq. 
4 000 2 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
A Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN' STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to notice, a conference was held the 25th day of 
September, 1995, between the Court and all parties through counsel, 
wherein all parties through counsel were in communication with the 
Court and other counsel; Robert C. Cummings, appearing as attorney 
for plaintiff, Derek K. Langton appearing as attorney for 
defendants, James T. Jensen, Jerry Jensen and Dix Jensen 
(hereinafter "defendants Jensen"), and Wilford N. Hansen, Jr. 
appearing as attorney for defendants, Wilford H. Hansen Stone 
Quarries, Inc., A Utah Corporation (hereinafter "Corporate 
i / > ^ 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
CONFIRMING DISMISSAL OF 
ALL CLAIMS 
Civil No. 940400611 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant"), and Sharron Killion (hereinafter "Killion"), and in 
said conference the Court considered the matter of the finality of 
the Order heretofore entered herein on the 27th day of April, 1995, 
entitled "Order Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment" and the court having hearing the arguments of counsel and 
having duly considered said matter, and whereas the Court intended 
in and by said order of April 27, 1995, to dismiss all claims in 
this action and not just those of the plaintiff, and whereas the 
Court desires by this Supplemental Order to remove any ambiguity as 
to the Court's said intention which may exist by reason of the 
wording of said order of April 27, 1995, 
NOW THEREFORE UPON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The claims in this action are (1) plaintiff 
complaint; (2) counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and 
defendant Killion against plaintiff; and (3) cross claim of 
Corporate Defendant and defendant Killion against "the other 
Defendants". That the aforesaid Order entered on April 27, 1995, 
was intended as a dismissal of all claims in this action, as 
follows, to-wit: consistent with the Court's ruling that plaintiff 
cannot sue or be sued, the said complaint and the said counterclaim 
were intended to be dismissed with prejudice, and the intent of the 
Court was to dismiss the said cross claim without prejudice. 
2. In ratification and confirmation of such intention, 
it is hereby declared and adjudged that plaintiff's said complaint 
-2-
and the said counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and of 
defendant Killion are dismissed with prejudice, and the said cross 
claim of the Corporate Defendant and of defendant Killion is 
dismissed without prejudice?; and it is adjudged that no claims of 
any kind are reserved for later determination by this Court, the 
Court having disposed of all claims as to all parties. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A copy of the foregoing proposed Supplemental Order was 
mailed to Derek Langton, attorney for defendants Jensen, at his 
address, P. 0. Box 45898, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898, and a 
copy was mailed to Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., attorney for the 
Corporate Defendant and for Sharron Killion, at his address, P. 0. 
Box 67, Payson, Utah 84651-0067, all postage prepaid, this 
"? > day of September, 1995. 
(<X*A fr &~ ; 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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